SimCyberGrid

The energy transition requires the extensive integration of renewable — and thus volatile— energy sources into the energy system. In this context, supply processes are highly decentralized but are not spatially constant due to the volatility of renewable energy availability.  The fundamental challenge underlying the energy system is the continuous balancing of generation and consumption within short, defined time intervals: Ideally, energy is consumed at the low-voltage level where it is generated or transferred to neighboring cells. In this way, generation and consumption can be kept in balance, for example, through dynamic pricing models. The need for cross-regional energy balancing is minimized. The resulting local, decentralized energy control and market platforms are referred to below as microgrids. These are physical low-voltage segments that will be controlled in the future by smart (local) distribution transformers.

The decentralized nature of these systems and their comparatively high communication demands pose a particular challenge. It is expected that today’s Powerlan-like isolated communication structures, such as remote control technology, will no longer suffice, and communication via conventional internet or even wireless 5G/6G technologies will be required. However, unlike remote control technology, this cannot be adequately monitored or secured and presents a very large attack surface. As critical infrastructure elements, these microgrids must be given special protection.

To this end, advanced monitoring and security procedures must be developed. In the SimCyberGrid project, a co-simulation consisting of a decentralised electrical grid as it would be perceived by a future grid control centre and the internet, which is exposed to cyberattacks, will be developed at the meta-level. The system will then be tested for realism and optimised through virtual cyberattacks.

The target groups for this system are:

• Electric grid operators seeking to optimize their grid security,
• providers of metering and control hardware—such as smart meter gateways—for security and robustness analysis, and
• government agencies and organizations responsible for critical infrastructure security and standardization, which use such simulation systems to gain insights into general requirements for securing distributed grid infrastructures.

The overarching objectives include the development and creation of an open, software-based co-simulation system, which is to be further developed as part of standardization efforts and integrates the following aspects:

1. Realistic simulation of the behavior of distributed, prosumer-based low-voltage grids (microgrids),
2. Simulation of the Internet-based communication network, with a focus on a realistic representation of cyberattacks, and
3. The combination of both systems, e.g., via smart meter gateways (SMG), as a co-simulation. Ideally, the SMG should not be able to distinguish between a real connection and the simulation. The overall system should behave realistically in response to cyberattacks with regard to Internet communication and consumer/generator control.

At the CC4E at the HAW Hamburg, which is participating in the project, only a software-based grid simulation is currently available. As part of the project, this simulation is to be expanded into a hardware-in-the-loop system for microgrids.

Research Questions and Sub-questions:

1. What architectural concept can be used to set up a co-simulation of Internet communication and microgrid control so that realistic latency times and response behaviors occur? (HAW Hamburg)
2. How can cyberattacks be designed, formulated, and carried out on the IT network so that they have a damaging effect on the power grid? (Lübeck University of Applied Sciences)
3. How can regulatory requirements for grid behavior be formulated using simulation, and what new cybersecurity requirements for distributed microgrids—which are largely self-sufficient in terms of their objectives—can be derived from this? (Hamburg University of Applied Sciences, Lübeck University of Applied Sciences, and associated partners)

This addresses the market need for secure communication solutions in largely self-sufficient, decentralized microgrids, as well as the necessary regulation of these systems as critical infrastructure. This regulation at the European level and the resulting approval by the BSI and the Federal Network Agency as critical infrastructure are mandatory prerequisites for their operation. However, since it is difficult to test the security of energy grids against cyberattacks under various boundary conditions, the co-simulation outlined above offers a significant advantage: Grids can be configured with different boundary conditions, and extreme events such as power outages can be tested and safeguarded against without risk. Thanks to collaboration on other projects with research institutes in the energy sector and grid security, there are strong scientific synergies and exchanges in this area, indicating a clear need for further research. This need stems primarily from the fact that scientific institutions rarely conduct research in the areas of grid stability, smart grids, and cybersecurity for Operational Technology (OT). At the HAW Hamburg, there is the rare combination of two large research groups within the same faculty working on these respective subtopics.

Project Team:

HAW CC4E: Prof. Dr. Kolja Eger, Felix Scholl
HAW FTZ CyberSec: Prof. Dr. Carsten Frank, Prof. Dr. Volker Skwarek, Sascha Kaven, Moritz Volkmann
TH Lübeck: Prof. Dr.-Ing. Milena Zachow, Julian Behrensen

Partners: Hamburger Energienetze (HNE), Deutsche Kommission Elektrotechnik Elektronik Informationstechnik in DIN und VDE (DKE), HiSolutions AG